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THE UNITED STATES FIRST-TO-INVENT SYSTEM: ECONOMIC
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO
SUZANNE KONRAD*
INTRODUCTION
While reform in the patent system is nothing new, the latest attempt to
change the United States patent system, the Patent Act of 2005, has reig-
nited one of the most intensely debated issues: whether the United States
should switch to a patent system that rewards the first inventor to file (a
first-to-file system). Although the United States has remained a system that
grants patents to the first person to invent since 1790,1 there have been
many attempts, especially since the early 1970s, to convert to a first-to-file
system.2 Despite support from many large corporations, these attempts
were unsuccessful because of protests by individual inventors and small
businesses. 3
However, the recent push for a first-to-file system is much stronger
because of the desire for patent harmonization. The United States is the
only patent system in the world that supports a first-to-invent system,
whereas every other country has a first-to-file system. 4 The National Acad-
emies, which act as advisers to the nation regarding science and engineer-
ing, published a 2004 report stressing that adopting a first-to-file system is
a "key part" of international patent harmonization. 5 Because of the
globalization of the world economy, many large companies doing business
abroad must file patents internationally as well as domestically. 6 Some
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007; B.S., Chemical Engineering, B.A.,
Spanish, Case Western Reserve University, 2002. 1 would like to thank Professor Kristen Osenga for
her insight and support in writing this article.
I. Robert W. Pritchard, The Future Is Now-The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291, 294-95 (1995).
2. Steven B. Kelber, Bill Has Issues All Will Debate; Scope and Complexity of Patent Reform
Act to Reach All Industry Sectors, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 29, 2005, at S1.
3. Id.
4. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 160 (2d ed. 2003).
5. Sam Mamudi, National Academies Call for First-to-File, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., May
2004, at 13.
6. Cliston Brown, Harmonization Gets a New Tune: Intellectual Property Owners Association
Calls for Simplicity, Coordination, INTELL. CAP., Nov. 2001.
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argue that time and money would. be saved by companies and foreign pat-
ent offices if every country applied the same laws and standards. 7 In the
last few years, as many Asian countries have become more industrialized,
the push for harmonization has gained new strength.
In response to the urge for harmonization, the Patent Act of 2005 was
introduced into the House of Representatives as H.R. 2795 on June 8, 2005,
by Congressman Lamar Smith (R-TX). 8 Section 3 of the bill changes the
United States to a system which grants patents to the first person to file a
patent application. 9 According to Congressman Berman of California, the
change would encourage faster public disclosure of inventions and would
help harmonize the United States patent system with the rest of the world. 10
This Article will attempt to show that, despite the argued benefits of
faster public disclosure and harmonization, the United States should not
adopt the first-to-file provision in the Patent Act of 2005. Part I of this Ar-
ticle examines the underlying policies of United States patent law, the his-
torical development of the first-to-invent system and attempts to convert to
a first-to-file system, and the current provisions of the first-to-invent sys-
tem. Part II explains the primary arguments for a first-to-file system, in-
cluding harmonization, simplicity in the system, faster public disclosure,
and lack of adverse effects on individual inventors and small businesses.
Part III illustrates the economic justifications behind the current first-to-
invent system and the incentives which the current system produces. Fi-
nally, Part IV concludes that the United States should keep the current first-
to-invent system because (1) the current system satisfies the economic goal
of wealth maximization while simultaneously producing the incentive to
devote resources to technological progress; (2) there is no net economic
benefit that would justify the switch to a first-to-file system; and (3) the
current system encourages more innovation.
This Article will show that despite the potential benefits of a first-to-
file system, only the current first-to-invent system strikes the correct bal-
ance between economic goals such as wealth maximization and the funda-
mental patent policy of promoting the progress of science. Because of the
economic incentives it creates, a first-to-file system would focus too heav-
ily on the overall resources that inventors possess and would push inventors
to devote their limited resources, not to inventing or promoting technologi-
7. Id.
8. Steven R. Ludwig, The Most Comprehensive Change to U.S. Patent Law, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, July 2005, at 8.
9. 151 CONG. REC. E 1160, E 1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005).
10. Id.
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cal progress, but rather to filing applications slightly faster. While har-
monization is important, it is more important that the United States main-
tain a scheme which correctly balances the policies that have kept this
system running for over 150 years.
I. THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM
The United States has long employed a first-to-invent system. Both
the history and policies of patent law help explain the reasons for and evo-
lution of the first-to-invent system. The following section explains the his-
torical and policy underpinnings of the United States patent system, as well
as the current first-to-invent system and how it addresses those policies.
A. History of Patent Law
The United States has never utilized a first-to-file system. The devel-
opment of the first-to-invent system can be charted from the very begin-
nings of patent law. In the last 30 years, many attempts have been made to
switch to a first-to-file system. However, none have been successful. The
following shows the evolution of the current system and summarizes the
attempts at conversion.
1. Evolution of the First-to-Invent System
The foundation for the United States patent system is the Patent
Clause of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."11 Based on this power, Congress enacted the first Patent Act
in 1790.12 The Act stated that the "first and true inventor" was entitled to a
patent.13 In 1793, a new act followed through with the "first and true inven-
tor" policy by providing a defense for potential infringers: if they could
show that the patentee was not the first to invent, the patentee would lose
the patent and therefore not have a cause of action for infringement. 14 Fi-
nally, in 1836 a new patent act created the Patent Office and the examina-
tion system and established a first-to-invent system to determine priority of
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
12. Peter A. Jackman, Adoption of a First-to-File Patent System: A Proposal, 26 U. BALT. L. REV.
67, 70-71 (1997).
13. Id. at 71.
14. Id.
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invention. 15 The courts interpreted the 1836 Act to establish that the first
person to conceive of an invention would prevail over another who reduced
the invention to practice first, as long as the first to conceive used reason-
able diligence in reducing to practice. 16 Subsequent acts were created in
1927, 1929, and 1939 which made changes to interference procedure. 17
Current interference proceedings occur when a patent application is filed
by one inventor that covers the same subject matter and therefore conflicts
with another pending application or an issued patent, 18 and these interfer-
ences are sometimes resolved by determining which party was the first to
invent. 19
2. Attempts to Convert to a First-to-File System
Beginning in the 1970s, legislation was regularly introduced into
Congress to convert the United States to a first-to-file system. 20 As far back
as 1966, a President's Commission on the Patent System recommended
changing to a first-to-file system, but because of opposition from industry
and intellectual property attorneys, the proposal was rejected by Con-
gress.2' However, the most significant push for a first-to-file system has
come from the desire for patent harmonization. One of the most prominent
attempts at patent harmonization arose in 1990, when the United Nations-
created World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") completed a
draft treaty of basic proposals and presented it to the United States. 22 Be-
cause the WIPO Basic Proposal would have required the United States to
switch to a first-to-file system, President Clinton eventually decided against
signing the harmonization treaty. 23 Additionally, Senate Bill 2605, intro-
duced in 1992, would have provided for a first-to-file system had it been
accepted.24 Yet despite the various attempts to convert to a first-to-file
system, the United States remains a first-to-invent system, largely for rea-
sons explained below. 25
15. 3A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.02(2)(a) (2005).
16. Id. § 10.02(2)(b).
17. Id. § 10.02(4).
18. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 256.
19. Id. at 256-58.
20. Kelber, supra note 2.
21. Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard in
Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543, 544.
22. Jackman, supra note 12, at 79.
23. Id. at 79-80.
24. Kevin Cuenot, Perilous Potholes in the Path Toward Patent Law Harmonization, 11 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 113 (1999).
25. See infra Part I.B.3.
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B. Underlying Policies
As the Supreme Court articulated, the patent system is "a carefully
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful,
and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclu-
sive right to practice the invention for a period of years."'26 The ultimate
goal, as articulated by the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the Constitu-
tion,2 7 is "to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts."'28 The courts
have generally advanced two policies for granting a patent monopoly to
inventors in order to promote the progress of science: (1) providing an
incentive to invest the necessary costs in developing an invention by giving
a patent monopoly to an inventor; and (2) promoting the disclosure of new
inventions in order to enlarge the public storehouse of knowledge. 29 How-
ever, a third policy has evolved in the first-to-file debate not as a policy
goal but rather an important policy justification for the current first-to-
invent system: fairness to small businesses and independent inventors. 30
Since these three policies will be affected by the adoption of a first-to-file
system, they are explained in detail below to provide a background to the
economic analysis of a first-to-file versus a first-to-invent system.
1. Incentive to Invent
The first policy goal, the incentive to invent, is created by giving the
monopoly of a patent to an inventor for a certain period of time in order to
induce him to incur the research and development costs of creating an in-
vention. 3 1 As I will discuss later, this incentive may be affected by a switch
because (1) a first-to-file system may decrease the number of inventors
who are participating in innovation, which thereby decreases the incentive
to invent, and (2) a first-to-file system may produce the incentive to invest
limited resources in filing, rather than inventing. Therefore, this is an im-
portant policy in the first-to-file debate.
26. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Natasha N. AIjaian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, II B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 1, 3 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
29. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimen-
tal Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024 (1989).
30. See Pritchard, supra note I, at 306-07.
31. Victor G. Cooper, U.S. Adoption of the International Standard of Patent Priority: Harmony or
Schizophrenia?, 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 697, 701-02 (1994).
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2. Public Disclosure
Another important policy goal of the patent system is to make innova-
tive information available to the public as soon as possible. According to
the Supreme Court, "the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new
designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure. '32
Hence the system aims to encourage inventors to bring their inventions into
the public domain as rapidly as possible by filing their patent applications
promptly. 33 This goal of promoting early public disclosure of inventions is
a key aspect in the first-to-file debate.
3. Fairness
While it is not necessarily a policy goal in promoting the progress of
science, fairness has evolved in first-to-file debates as a key consideration
in retention of the first-to-invent system. That fairness is an independent
policy of the patent system is supported by (1) governmental statements
regarding the first-to-invent system and (2) congressional assent. Although
the other policy goals are constitutionally based on the Patent Clause, fair-
ness is often cited as a reason for keeping the current system and is thus
itself a key policy consideration in patent law.
During the Patent and Trademark Office's harmonization hearings in
1993, opponents of the first-to-file system argued that the change would
favor large companies at the expense of individual inventors. 34 When then-
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown announced that the United States would
not adopt a first-to-file system in 1994, his basis was that small inventors
and entrepreneurs would not benefit from the change and that the first-to-
invent system had worked well in the past.35 Therefore the United States
government supported the view that fairness to individual inventors and
small businesses was an important policy that could not be overlooked in
the patent system.
Congress has also seemed to adopt fairness as an independent policy
of the patent system through its discussions of the first-to-file system. Ac-
cording to Senate debates regarding the Patent Harmonization Act of 1992,
the current first-to-invent system is based on the notion that it is fair to
award a patent to the first inventor.36 Moreover, early attempts to switch to
a first-to-file system were turned down by Congress because of opposition
32. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
33. Jackman, supra note 12, at 86.
34. Pritchard, supra note 1, at 307.
35. Id. at 309.
36. 138 CONG. REC. S5288 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1992).
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by small businesses and universities. 37 Since small businesses and universi-
ties have typically argued for maintaining the current system because it is
fair to them, 38 Congress has assented to the policy of fairness by turning
down first-to-file attempts based on the opposition of small businesses and
independent inventors.
C. The Current First-to-Invent System
Although the United States awards a patent to the first person to in-
vent, the system's complexity must be explained in more detail to later
demonstrate that the current system meets the underlying policy goals. The
primary aspects of the first-to-invent scheme are (1) the priority rule and
(2) the statutory bar ensuring that inventors disclose their invention in a
timely manner.
1. The Priority Rule and Diligence
In an 1893 patent case, Judge Taft stated the priority rule that is the
basis for the first-to-invent system:
[T]he man who first reduces an invention to practice is prima facie the
first and true inventor, but ... the man who first conceives, and, in a
mental sense, first invents ... may date his patentable invention back to
the time of its conception, if he connects the conception with its reduc-
tion to practice by reasonable diligence on his part. 39
Since one way to show reduction to practice is to file a patent applica-
tion,40 the rule demonstrates that a patent will be rewarded to the first per-
son to "invent" or conceive even if he is not the first to file, as long as he
can show diligence in filing his application or otherwise reducing his in-
vention to practice. As the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals articu-
lated, "An inventor who is the first to conceive an invention can prevail, no
matter how limited his resources may be, . . . if he devotes those resources
at his command with reasonable and continuous diligence toward the actual
reduction to practice of the invention. '41 In the interference context, this
diligence requirement and the general rule of priority have been codified in
§ 102(g) of the current Patent Act.42
37. Kelber, supra note 2.
38. Pritchard, supra note 1, at 307.
39. Christie v. Seybold, 55 F. 69, 76 (6th Cir. 1893).
40. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 264.
41. Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 921 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g)(2) (2000).
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2. The Public Use Statutory Bar
Despite the rule of giving a patent to the first person to invent, the
public use bar operates to ensure that the first inventor discloses his inven-
tion to the public in a timely manner. Under § 102(b), an inventor must file
a patent application within one year of any public use or offer to sell his
invention.43 Effectively, this avoids two problems with a "pure" first-to-
invent system.
First, it prevents inventors from "sitting" on an invention and waiting
for others to independently create it, then stepping in to assert priority and
demand a large portion of the profits reaped by the independent inven-
tors.44 Without the statutory bar, one who is the first to invent could "in-
vent" and then wait for others to start commercially using the invention
before filing because the inventor is entitled to assert priority and obtain the
patent regardless of when the application is filed. While the inventor is
waiting to file the patent application, competitors in the market could also
develop the invention and begin practicing it, not knowing that another has
a patent right because no application has been filed. Because patent owners
are often able to collect lost profits from a patent infringer, the inventor
could simply wait for more profits to accrue to his competitors before he
sues in order to receive more money for patent infringement. The inventor
therefore has little incentive to disclose his invention quickly. This in turn
undermines the essential goal of patent law, public disclosure, since the
public is forced to wait to learn of the invention until the inventor decides
to file his application. With the one-year time limit to file a patent applica-
tion set forth in § 102(b), the public is guaranteed to learn of the invention
quickly because the inventor must disclose within one year of commercial-
izing the invention in order to preserve his patent rights.45
Second, the statutory bar prevents the inventor from bringing a prod-
uct to market, starting to profit from the invention, and then waiting to file
for a patent until many years later when competition arises, 46 thereby de-
priving the public of the full knowledge of the invention and preventing
improvements in the invention. Allowing the inventor to wait indefinitely
to file for a patent would also allow him to extend the patent "monopoly"
past the limited time granted in the Constitution.47 The statutory bar effec-
tively provides the inventor with a one-year grace period to perfect his
43. Id. § 102(b).
44. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 179.
45. Id. at 180.
46. Id. at 179-80.
47. Id. at 180.
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invention and file an application before he loses the benefit of priority and
is prevented from obtaining a patent on such invention. 48 This bar is essen-
tial to ensuring timely public disclosure of inventions.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR A FIRST-TO-FILE SYSTEM
Despite the historical adherence to a first-to-invent system, many have
advocated the switch to a first-to-file system. The primary arguments ad-
vanced for the conversion are (1) international harmonization; (2) a simpler
and therefore more efficient system of priority; (3) faster public disclosure
of inventions; and (4) minimal effects on fairness to individual inventors
and small businesses. 49
A. International Harmonization
One of the primary justifications offered for switching to a first-to-file
system is harmonization of the United States patent system with the rest of
the world. While the United States operates under a first-to-invent system,
every other economically dominant country in the world, and virtually
every other country, employs a first-to-file system. 50 Because technological
innovation has been decreasing the gap between nations and increasing
opportunities for international trade, the role of patent law is essential to
advancing the global economy. 51 Many thus argue that the United States
should adopt a first-to-file system in order to facilitate worldwide harmoni-
zation of the patent laws and thereby establish uniform and valid interna-
tional patent protection.52 Congressman Berman noted the importance of
patent harmonization when he stated that one of the benefits of the first-to-
file system in the Patent Act of 2005 would be bringing the U.S. patent
laws into harmony with the rest of the world.53
However, there are many reasons why patent harmonization should
not be the basis for switching to a first-to-file system. First, despite Con-
gressman Berman's statement that adopting a first-to-file system will har-
monize the U.S. patent laws with the rest of the world, the switch will not
automatically facilitate harmonization. Even if laws are uniform from
48. Id.
49. See 151 CONG. REC. El 160, E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005); Macedo, supra note 21, at 566-
70.
50. Coe A. Bloomberg, In Defense of the First-to-Invent Rule, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 256 (1993);
Brown, supra note 6; Macedo, supra note 21, at 545; Mamudi, supra note 5.
51. Jackman, supra note 12, at 67.
52. Id.
53. 151 CONG. REC. at El 160.
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country to country, political and nationalistic factors may play a significant
role in the way the laws are implemented. 54 Thus adopting a first-to-file
system would not necessarily solve all the problems with patent harmoniza-
tion.
Second, having complete international harmonization may actually be
detrimental to the patent law because (1) the law would be unresponsive to
local variations; (2) interjurisdictional competition would be eliminated;
and (3) the chances for legal experimentation would be decreased. 5 5 While
the law might be procedurally harmonized, legal experimentation is impor-
tant in deciding issues such as whether a first-to-invent or first-to-file sys-
tem better creates the incentives to achieve the primary goals of patent law.
Complete uniformity in the law may also stifle innovation. 56 This argument
is beyond the scope of this Article, but the argument is interesting. 5
7
Third, one of the most common arguments against harmonization is
that the United States system has worked well for over 150 years, so there
is no need to change it. 58 In fact, some believe that since Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution discusses securing exclusive rights to the first "inven-
tor," as a matter of linguistics, changing to a first-to-file system is unconsti-
tutional. 59 While all of these arguments are beyond the scope of this paper
and will therefore not be discussed in detail, they show that harmonization
alone cannot be the basis for converting to a first-to-file system.
B. Simplicity in the System
Supporters of the first-to-file system also often argue that it will sim-
plify things, since one will only need to compare the respective filing dates
of the two inventors to determine priority, rather than conduct complex
interference proceedings.60 By decreasing the complexity of interference
proceedings, some believe that there will be significant savings by decreas-
ing the costs associated with proving a date of invention through research
notebooks and other documents.6 1 If there were significant cost savings,
54. Bloomberg, supra note 50, at 261. Using the United States and Japan as examples, Mr.
Bloomberg cites specific instances in which nationalistic factors were believed to play a significant role
in granting patents.
55. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685,
686 (2002).
56. Id. at 691.
57. For a more thorough discussion of the theory that complete harmonization is detrimental and
will stifle innovation, see id. at 691-92.
58. Bloomberg, supra note 50, at 256.
59. Id.
60. Macedo, supra note 21, at 570.
61. Id.
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both big businesses and individual inventors alike would benefit from the
simpler system.
However, there is one fatal flaw with this argument: simplifying prior-
ity determinations alone will not necessarily decrease the cost of interfer-
ence proceedings. Interferences occur when "an application is made for a
patent which ... would interfere with any pending application, or with any
unexpired patent." 62 These interferences often arise when there is an issue
of priority between two pending patent applications or between a patent
application and an issued patent; 63 typically there is a "senior" party with
the earliest filing date and a "junior" party with a later filing date.64 How-
ever, interferences may be resolved through issues of patent validity, 65 such
as obviousness, novelty, and use. Any analysis of obviousness requires a
court to determine the level of "ordinary skill in the art," which often in-
volves multiple witnesses testifying about the level of skill typical in the
field at issue and thereby increasing the complexity of the interference
proceeding. Thus decreasing the cost of determining priority in an interfer-
ence proceeding might not necessarily save that much money, since there
will still be costs during the interference associated with determining obvi-
ousness and other issues of patent validity.
Moreover, adoption of the first-to-file system set forth in the Patent
Act of 2005 will most likely not result in the procedural simplicity and cost
savings promised because of prior user rights. While the Act proposes
elimination of the current first-to-invent system, it also includes an expan-
sion of prior user rights.66 Prior user rights are available as an infringement
defense to protect individuals and businesses that began practicing an in-
vention before it was patented by another.67 In order to obtain prior user
rights, a defendant "must have commercially used the infringing subject
matter prior to the effective filing date of the patent."'68 Although prior user
rights in the United States are currently available only in the context of
business method patents, 69 prior user rights abroad apply to any type of
62. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2000).
63. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 256.
64. Id. at 257. Interferences can occur between two issued patents if the USPTO fails to recognize
the interference during the application stage. However, this should be a rare occurrence and is addressed
by § 291 of the Patent Act.
65. Id. at 258. If the patent or patent application of the senior party is invalid, the junior party will
prevail despite his later filing date and thus priority is not the sole determinant in an interference pro-
ceeding.
66. 151 CONG. REC. El 160, El 160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005).
67. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 927-28.
68. Id. at 928.
69. Id. at 927-28. The United States has provided this defense as a remedy for the situation caused
by State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), in
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invention. 70 By expanding its prior user rights in an attempt to harmonize
the patent system, the United States would essentially replace the complex-
ity and costs associated with determining priority of invention with deter-
mining whether an "applicant for a prior user right had commercially used
the invention before the filing date of the patent which had been
awarded. '71 For the aforementioned reasons, simplicity is not a sufficient
basis for the switch to a first-to-file system.
C. Faster Public Disclosure
Another common basis argued for the switch to a first-to-file system is
that it will encourage inventors to disclose their invention to the public
faster. According to proponents of the Patent Act of 2005, a first-to-file
system would encourage inventors to file immediately, enabling the inven-
tion to enter the public realm more quickly. 72 By rewarding the first to file
with the patent, the system would create the economic incentive for inven-
tors to file a patent application as soon as possible, thereby fulfilling one of
the primary goals of the patent system.
However, the faster disclosure anticipated by the change to a first-to-
file system may not have as great of an effect as anticipated. The United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") must publish patent appli-
cations promptly once eighteen months has expired from the date the appli-
cation was filed.73 While the USPTO currently publishes approximately
ninety percent of patent applications within eighteen months, some applica-
tions are published even slower. 74 Since the public does not have access to
the information contained in a patent application before it is published, one
could argue that if publication already takes eighteen months or longer, the
amount of time saved in getting the information to the public by the first-
to-file system may be negligible. Furthermore, a published patent applica-
tion is not a finalized document, since patent prosecution and correspon-
dence between the USPTO and inventors can significantly alter the claims
which the Federal Circuit held that business methods are patentable subject matter. ADELMAN ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 927. Because business methods had long been regarded as unpatentable subject matter,
many companies that had relied on trade secrets to protect their methods were statutorily barred from
seeking patent protection; to soften the blow, Congress enacted the First Inventor Defense Act to pro-
tect these businesses against infringement suits. Id.
70. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 928.
71. Macedo, supra note 21, at 571.
72. 151 CONG. REC. El 160, E 1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005).
73. 37 C.F.R. § 1.211 (a) (2005).
74. Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1017, 1038-39 (2004).
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of a patent between the time the application is published and the patent
actually issues.
Most importantly, though, a first-to-file system may lead to a decrease
in the quality of information given to the public. Many critics of a first-to-
file system fear that switching will result in a decline in the quality of ap-
plications due to applications being prepared rapidly with fewer examples
in order to beat the "race" to the patent office. 75 Because the ultimate goal
of the patent law is to promote the advancement of science and technology,
it is imperative that the public have the best information possible to im-
prove on the existing technologies disclosed in patents. Thus, the scientific
community benefits much more from a patent based on a carefully prepared
disclosure of a complete invention rather than a hastily prepared disclosure
of an incomplete concept, which was filed simply to win the race to the
patent office. 76 For the aforementioned reasons, a first-to-file system may
not necessarily further the goal of promoting the progress of science
through public disclosure.
D. Minimal Effects on Fairness
Despite protests that a first-to-file system would harm small busi-
nesses and individual inventors, supporters of the change argue that few
inventors would actually be hurt by the switch and may actually benefit
from the change. The two primary bases for this argument are (1) the vast
majority of patents are already awarded to the first person to file an
application and (2) a first-to-file scheme will simplify the system and
thereby benefit individual inventors by avoiding expensive interference
proceedings.
1. First to Invent Is Generally the First to File
Since fairness is a key policy in the first-to-file debate, advocates of a
first-to-file system claim that this principle is not compromised because
most patents under a first-to-invent system are already awarded to the first
person to file.77 Most of the evidence relied on to support this contention is
statistical. In interference proceedings, statistics show that the first party to
file wins seventy-five percent of the time. 78 However, statistics can be de-
ceptive.
75. Bloomberg, supra note 50, at 260.
76. Id.
77. Pritchard, supra note 1, at 307.
78. Macedo, supra note 21, at 568.
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First of all, interference proceedings turn on more than just priority
determinations; interferences can be decided on issues such as proof of
conception and date of invention, diligent pursuit, reduction to practice,
non-abandonment, and even patentability.7 9 Thus, the fact that seventy-five
percent of interferences are decided in favor of the first party to file does
not mean that the first party to file was always the first party to invent. The
second party to file may have been the first to invent, but his patent was
invalid and therefore the first to file prevailed in the interference.
Second, even if statistics may be convincing, there are other statistics
indicating that the first party to file does not always prevail. Supporters of
the first-to-invent system are quick to note that in interference proceedings
that actually go to final hearings, the second party to file actually wins
forty-eight percent of the time. 80 Thus, nearly half of the inventors who
would be given priority under the current system would be prevented from
obtaining patents under the first-to-file system.81 For those reasons, mere
statistics cannot be used to support the view that fairness will not be com-
promised under a first-to-file system.
2. Individual Inventors Will Benefit from the Simplified System
Advocates of a first-to-file system believe that not only will the switch
not harm individual inventors and small businesses, it will actually benefit
them. Interferences alone are very costly to patent applicants. 82 Because the
issue of fairness to individual inventors and small businesses stems from a
concern about their lack of resources relative to larger corporations, any
reduction in costs for patent applicants would seem to promote fairness to
those inventors.
However, the fallacy in logic of this argument is yet again that merely
converting to a first-to-file system will not necessarily reduce costs. Be-
cause interference proceedings could be decided on bases other than prior-
ity, merely eliminating the need to determine the first inventor will not
completely eliminate the need for interference proceedings. Furthermore,
as previously discussed, the reduced costs in interference proceedings for
determining the first inventor would be replaced with the 2005 Patent Act's
prior user rights provisions. 83 Thus evidence proffered by the first-to-file
79. James E. White, The U.S. First-to-Invent System, the Mossinghoff Conclusion, . . and Statis-
tics, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 357, 361 (2003).
80. Macedo, supra note 21, at 568.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 570.
83. Seesupra Part lI.B.
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advocates does not demonstrate that the switch will result in any cost sav-
ings to small business and individual inventors, let alone any significant
cost savings that will offset the potential harm of losing to larger compa-
nies who file their applications first.
III. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FIRST-TO-INVENT SYSTEM
Although first-to-file advocates claim many benefits from the switch,
the current system should remain from an economic standpoint, because it
satisfies the economic goal of wealth maximization while also producing
the incentive that is the primary goal of patent law: inducing inventors to
invest the resources necessary to "promote the progress of Science." While
harmonization and simplification of the patent system are argued as bases
for a first-to-file system, those benefits may not actually be achieved by
switching to a first-to-file system. 84 The major economic benefit of a first-
to-file system is supposed cost savings from simplification of determining
who invented first. 85 However, any costs saved by simplification could
potentially be replaced by costs in determining prior user rights.8 6 Addi-
tionally, a first-to-file system would focus too much on the financial re-
sources of large companies and ignore the underlying economic incentives
that will be created, whereas the current system achieves wealth maximiza-
tion without creating a disincentive to invest the necessary resources to
"promote the progress of Science." As this Article will demonstrate, Con-
gress should not adopt a first-to-file system because (1) the current system
is carefully crafted to achieve the economic efficiency goal of wealth
maximization; (2) the switch to a first-to-file system will not produce a net
benefit to society and therefore is not justified economically; and (3) the
current system gives more inventors an incentive to compete, which
thereby stimulates innovation and accomplishes the Constitutional goal of
"promoting the progress of Science and useful Arts. '87
A. Wealth Maximization
Because of the context and underlying goals of patent law, wealth
maximization is best achieved under a first-to-invent system. The eco-
nomic theory of law espouses the belief that under wealth maximization,
the most efficient allocation of resources is the one that produces the most
84. Seesupra Part I.A-B.
85. Macedo, supra note 21, at 570.
86. Id.at571.
87. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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wealth overall. 88 Because "wealth" is measured by how much someone is
willing and able to pay for a resource, 89 the maximum overall wealth is
achieved when resources are in the hands of those most willing and able to
pay for them. 90 At first, it may appear that this is better accomplished under
a first-to-file system, because the first-to-file system generally favors larger
companies with more financial resources who can file patent applications
faster.91 Therefore, one may assume that the resource-the patent-is be-
ing awarded to the larger company who is more willing and able to pay to
file faster. However, the problem with this assumption is that it fails to
analyze the issue in the context of patent law. Because the underlying goal
of patent law is promoting the progress of science by rewarding a patent in
order to induce inventors to invest their resources in developing an inven-
tion,92 wealth maximization in patent law requires that a patent be given
not to the one that is willing to invest the most money in filing a patent, but
rather the one that is willing and able to invest the most money in develop-
ing an invention. The current first-to-invent system is therefore economi-
cally just because it (1) rewards a patent to the one most willing and able to
invest the resources to invent and (2) simultaneously creates the incentive
for inventors to devote their limited resources to developing an invention,
rather than filing a patent application faster.
1. Efficient Allocation of Resources
The current first-to-invent system satisfies the economic goal of
wealth maximization by rewarding a patent to the inventor who is most
willing and able to pay to develop the invention. Under a first-to-invent
system, the patent is rewarded to the first inventor to develop or "invent"
an invention. Because the first to invent must either pay the most money to
develop an invention before his competitors or must develop the invention
the most efficiently, either way the patent reward is economically justified.
If an inventor is willing to pay the most money to develop an invention
before others, the goal of wealth maximization is obviously satisfied by
awarding him the patent. However, if an inventor can create an invention
before others without spending as much money, the economic theory of
law would still support awarding the patent to that inventor.
88. Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 739, 753 (1995).
89. Id.
90. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-11 (6th ed. 2003).
91. Scott Erickson, Patent Law and New Product Development: Does Priority Claim Basis Make
A Difference?, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 327, 328 (1999).
92. Cooper, supra note 31, at 701-02.
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If an inventor is able to develop a technology first without using as
much money as others, he is more efficient because he can use his remain-
ing resources to develop new technologies and ideas. Wealth maximization
is concerned with reducing inefficiencies and the waste of scarce re-
sources, 93 so patent law should reward an inventor who is able to develop a
technology using less money and therefore does not waste resources. Redi-
recting scarce resources to further technological progress is also an impor-
tant economic goal, 94 and awarding the patent to an inventor who can
invent first without using as many resources will encourage inventors to
develop technologies more efficiently and use their remaining resources to
invent new technologies or improve existing technologies. This in turn
accomplishes the underlying goal of patent law, "promoting the progress of
Science and useful Arts." 95
2. Incentive Effect
The current first-to-invent system also achieves the important eco-
nomic goal of creating the correct incentives in patent law. Another impor-
tant objective of law and economics is to use the law to create desired
incentives.96 Because the patent law is a "carefully crafted bargain" de-
signed to encourage the creation and disclosure of advances in technology
in return for a patent, 97 the patent reward must create the incentives to in-
vest the resources necessary in both creating and disclosing advances in
technology. The current first-to-invent system accomplishes this goal by
giving inventors the incentive to focus their resources on creating techno-
logical advances while simultaneously ensuring that those technological
advances are disclosed in a timely manner via the statutory bars of 35
U.S.C. § 102(b).
Because the primary goal of patent law is promoting the progress of
science by inducing inventors to spend the money necessary to create ad-
vances in technology, 98 the primary focus of an inventor's resources should
be on developing or "inventing" new technologies. Although a first-to-file
system may appear economically efficient because it favors large compa-
nies with more financial resources, it is economically inferior to the current
93. Sunny Handa, Reverse Engineering Computer Programs Under Canadian Copyright Law, 40
MCGILL L.J. 621, 679 n.250 (1995).
94. Id. at 679.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
96. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Methodology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 351, 363
(2001).
97. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
98. AIjalian, supra note 28, at 3.
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first-to-invent system because it focuses too much on the amount of re-
sources rather than the incentives it creates. Under a first-to-file system, a
premium will be placed on the speedy filing of patent applications,99 since
the first inventor to file will prevail in a priority dispute. In order to file
applications as quickly as possible, inventors and their companies will be
required to devote a significant number of additional resources to both
preparing and filing patent applications. 100 A first-to-file system would
therefore encourage inventors to divert a significant amount of their limited
resources from developing new technologies to simply building up legal
departments or hiring more outside attorneys to file applications faster.
Moreover, as each company begins to file faster than other companies, all
companies will be forced to "race" with other companies and simply invest
more resources in creating even faster filing departments. This needlessly
encourages inventors to use increasingly less of their limited resources to
develop technologies in order to file faster. By placing a premium on inno-
vation, the current first-to-invent system creates the desired incentive to
promote the progress of science by investing the necessary resources in
developing or improving new technologies.
B. No Net Economic Benefit
Apart from its inferiority in wealth maximization, a first-to-file system
is also economically undesirable because the switch would not produce a
net societal benefit. In order to be economically beneficial, the benefits of a
first-to-file system must outweigh the costs of switching to that system.
However, there is no net economic benefit in adopting a first-to-file system
because (1) the cost of switching systems is significant; (2) there is no
benefit in certainty because uncertainty also exists in a first-to-file system;
and (3) a first-to-file system could lead to a wasteful use of resources where
companies compete for faster filing systems rather than devoting their re-
sources to innovation.
1. Switching Costs
A switch from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system will necessarily
entail many transaction costs. 101 First, there will be significant costs to
producers and inventors in the private sector of redirecting their limited
resources toward filing faster. By rewarding a patent to the first to invent,
99. Macedo, supra note 21, at 579.
100. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 305.
101. Macedo,supra note 21, at 566.
[Vol 82:3
THE UNITED STATES FIRST-TO-INVENT SYSTEM
the current system emphasizes technological progress and encourages in-
ventors to focus their resources on creating or improving a technology.102
Although the § 102(b) statutory bars serve as a type of statute of limitations
on filing an application by preventing inventors from commercially exploit-
ing their inventions for more than one year before they file, 103 inventors are
not required to disclose their inventions until they have commercially ex-
ploited them. 104 Therefore, a first-to-invent system creates the incentive for
inventors to (1) devote most of their resources to the research and devel-
opment of new technologies and (2) use only the minimum amount of re-
sources necessary to file within the time. established by § 102(b).
Under a first-to-file system, on the other hand, inventors would be
forced to focus many more resources on hiring lawyers and building up a
legal staff to file patent applications faster.105 This redirecting of resources
would be a significant cost for producers and inventors in the private sec-
tor. The amount of resources for each inventor or company is limited, 106 so
corporations and businesses would have to develop new budgets and per-
form detailed economic analyses to determine the new optimal allocation
of resources towards filing versus research and development. Additionally,
because of the inherent "race" to the USPTO that will be created by a first-
to-file system, 107 in order to determine the appropriate amount of resources
to invest in filing applications, inventors must first determine the amount of
resources their competitors are dedicating to filing so that they know how
much they must invest to file faster. Significant costs in gathering informa-
tion must be considered in any economic analysis, 108 and here the vast time
and money that must be invested in making and implementing the business
decisions necessary to switch to a first-to-file system make the cost of
switching very high for inventors.
102. See Aljalian, supra note 28, at 3. Additionally, as previously explained, the effect of the
current first-to-invent system is to create the incentive for inventors to focus their resources on develop-
ing a technology, rather than filing faster than other companies. See supra Part III.A.
103. ADELMAN ETAL., supra note 4, at 179-80.
104. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
105. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 305.
106. Handa, supra note 92, at 679 (stating that resources are scarce and directing those resources
toward technical progress is a desirable goal).
107. Cuenot, supra note 24, at 114.
108. See Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 409, 437 (2001) (stating that the time and other costs involved with one
system or methodology should be considered in a cost-benefit analysis of the relative merits of that
system or methodology).
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2. Uncertainty
Aside from the high transaction costs associated with switching to first
to file, a first-to-file system does not offer the economic benefits of sim-
plicity or certainty that many of its supporters claim. As previously dis-
cussed, 109 any claimed cost savings in simplicity by eliminating priority
determinations will likely be offset by costs in determining prior user
rights. Advocates of a first-to-file system also argue that the uncertainty
associated with the current first-to-invent system, particularly interference
proceedings, has detrimental economic implications. 1' 0 The time and diffi-
culty in determining the first to invent in an interference proceeding can
greatly extend the pendency of applications, which can result in the issu-
ance of a patent many years after it was originally filed.II Because appli-
cations remain secret while they are pending before the USPTO, many in
the industry may have made "significant investments to develop the same
technology based on cost assumptions that do not take into account the
pendency of an unknown patent application." 1 2 The "carefully crafted"
patent bargain is premised on the idea that inventors will be induced to
spend the money necessary to develop new technologies in exchange for a
patent monopoly.113 Therefore, any uncertainty in actually receiving a pat-
ent for their investment may deter many inventors from putting forth the
necessary resources and will thereby sacrifice the Constitutional goal of
promoting the progress of science. First-to-file supporters believe that the
simplification in determining inventorship at the time of filing will elimi-
nate the uncertainty and unpredictability of the current system." 14
However, there would be no more certainty in the economic sense un-
der a first-to-file system than under the current first-to-invent system. Al-
though a first-to-file system would give inventors more certainty by settling
the question of priority once their applications were filed, 115 this does not
address the issue of economic efficiency. Certainty promotes economic
efficiency only by allowing parties to determine ahead of time whether or
not they wish to be subject to a given rule. 116 In order to be efficient, then,
a first-to-file system would have to create certainty for inventors that they
109" See supra Part l.B.
110. Bloomberg, supra note 50, at 259.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
114. Pritchard, supra note 1, at 314.
115. Id.
116. James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing
Rules, 79 MINN. L. REV. 529, 533 (1995).
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would obtain priority before they invest their resources in innovation. Be-
cause any ex ante determinations of priority necessarily depend on knowl-
edge of competitors and their resources, from an ex ante efficiency
standpoint, a first-to-file system suffers the same lack of certainty as a
first-to-invent system. Under a first-to-invent system, inventors take the
risk of investing resources in "inventing" knowing that they may lose prior-
ity if another has the resources to invent faster. Likewise, under a first-to-
file system, even if inventors have invested significant resources in build-
ing fast filing systems, they may still lose priority if another company has a
slightly faster filing system. Therefore inventors under both the first-to-
invent and first-to-file systems face some uncertainty in knowing ex ante
whether they will be awarded priority. The entire purpose of the patent
system is to induce inventors to accept that risk of uncertainty in priority by
investing their resources in exchange for the potential monopoly in their
technology. 117 But the risk of uncertainty is the same for both first-to-file
and first-to-invent systems, so no economic benefit is achieved by the sup-
posed "certainty" of a first-to-file system.
3. Waste
Another significant cost with a first-to-file system is the waste of re-
sources in the competition to file fastest. Under a first-to-file system, com-
panies and inventors will be forced to devote significant resources to filing
quickly. 118 However, because only the first to file will prevail, it is not
enough for inventors to file quickly; they must file the quickest. So as each
inventor develops a faster filing system, other inventors will be forced to
devote even more resources to preparing and filing patent applications. 19
While it is important to disclose inventions to the public quickly, 120 this
constant reinvestment of resources in hiring attorneys or staff to file
slightly faster than other inventors is wasteful. Under the current system,
where the "race" is to invent first, the constant reinvestment of resources
will be not in filing somewhat faster but rather in developing technology or
ideas faster than other inventors. Because the ultimate goal of the patent
law, as expressed in the Constitution, is to "promote the progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts," 121 this devotion of additional resources toward inno-
vation is a beneficial use of resources. Therefore, the switch to a first-to-
117. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51.
118. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 305.
119. See id.
120. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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file system will result in a net economic loss, because resources that would
have been devoted to innovation will now be used to file faster and faster
patent applications, even if the difference in the speed of filing is negligi-
ble.
C. Innovation
One of the most important benefits of the current first-to-invent sys-
tem is innovation. Although Anglo-American tradition suggests that the
first-to-invent system is better because it is "inherently fairer to grant a
patent to the first inventor than to the first discloser," or that the first inven-
tor is more deserving, 122 granting a patent to the first to invent also has
economic consequences. By promoting a system that does not disfavor
individual inventors and small businesses who do not possess the resources
to file faster than big businesses, the patent system encourages more people
to experiment and develop new technologies. If more people are participat-
ing in innovation, the patent system is fulfilling its constitutional goal of
"promoting the progress of Science and useful Arts." 123 Because the "race"
to the USPTO, which is an inherent consequence of adopting a first-to-file
regime, 124 will severely discourage individual inventors and small busi-
nesses from investing their resources in developing technologies, the
United States must maintain a first-to-invent system.
In a "race" to the Patent Office, small businesses or inventors with
fewer resources will almost always lose. 125 In order to file earlier than
other inventors, a company or individual must have enough patent attor-
neys working to draft the application quickly. The increased number of
applications resulting from a first-to-file system will thus require compa-
nies seeking patents to spend the money necessary to hire more attorneys to
prepare and file those applications. Moreover, experienced attorneys will
generally be able to draft applications quicker, so a firm seeking to file
quickest would also need to acquire the best attorneys. This will also in-
volve a significant financial investment by companies seeking to file more
rapidly. Because small firms will not be able to invest nearly as many re-
sources into simply filing patents, larger companies such as IBM, which
have the resources to adopt an "early-and-often filing strategy," 126 will
122. Macedo, supra note 21, at 576.
123. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
124. Cuenot, supra note 24, at 114.
125. See White, supra note 78, at 362 (stating that independent inventors benefit from a first-to-
invent system because they cannot "spend the hundreds of thousands [of dollars] it would take to adopt
an early-and-often filing strategy").
126. Id.
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always prevail. An essential aspect to the patent bargain is giving inventors
the incentive to invest the up-front research and development costs neces-
sary to create a technology that will result in a patent.' 2 7 If small businesses
and individual inventors feel that they will never prevail in obtaining a
patent because they do not have the resources to compete with larger com-
panies, they will lose the incentive to invest the initial costs required to
develop a technology. This will result in fewer companies competing to
innovate and "promote the progress of Science and useful Arts."
Encouraging small businesses to compete for a patent also satisfies the
economic goal of giving inventors an incentive to invest the necessary re-
sources in research and development. As Professor Scherer of Harvard
University, a scholar in the field of innovative activity, points out, competi-
tion may itself stimulate innovation. 128 One basic incentive for many com-
panies to engage in research and development is competition, because "[i]f
you don't keep running on the treadmill, you're going to be thrown off."1
29
Since the primary purpose of granting patents is to induce inventors to in-
vest their resources in creating and improving upon technologies, 130 the
patent law should encourage competition. Because a first-to-file system
disfavors small businesses and individual inventors, 131 it would decrease
the amount of competition and therefore decrease the incentive for compa-
nies to invest in innovation. However, the current first-to-invent system
promotes the maximum amount of competition by encouraging both big
businesses and individual inventors to innovate and invest in new tech-
nologies. Therefore a switch to a first-to-file system would sacrifice the
important economic goal of innovation by discouraging competition from
small businesses.
CONCLUSION
The United States should not adopt the first-to-file provision in the
proposed Patent Act of 2005. The first-to-invent system has been in use for
over 150 years. Because practitioners, judges, and inventors are trained
under and accustomed to the current system, there are high transaction
costs associated with switching to a first-to-file system. Therefore, unless
127. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 27; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141,150-51 (1989).
128. Ramsey Shehadeh & Marion B. Stewart, An Economic Approach to the "Balance of Hard-
ships" and "Public Interest" Tests for Preliminary Injunction Motions in Patent Infringement Cases,
83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 341, 356 (2001).
129. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
130. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51.
131. See White, supra note 79, at 362.
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the first-to-file system provides clear benefits over the existing system such
that the transaction costs are sufficiently justified or offset, the United
States should maintain the status quo. Although there are arguable benefits
in a first-to-file system, the current system satisfies the policy goals of pat-
ent law and a switch would not decrease costs to the system and society
significantly. Thus, a change is not justified.
The primary goals of the patent system are (1) promoting the progress
of science by providing an incentive for inventors to invest the develop-
ment costs necessary to innovate and (2) encouraging the prompt disclosure
of new inventions in order to provide the public with information necessary
to continue innovating and improving upon technology. The current system
satisfies these goals by placing small businesses and individual inventors
on equal ground with larger companies, thus satisfying important economic
goals and promoting the progress of science and technology by encourag-
ing as many inventors as possible, not just large businesses, to innovate and
develop new inventions. The statutory bars in § 102(b) also safeguard the
system against delays in filing patent applications, thereby encouraging
prompt disclosure of inventions by preventing inventors from obtaining a
patent if they wait to file an application until more than one year after the
invention is publicly used or sold. Thus, the current system adequately
satisfies the underlying goals of the patent system.
Moreover, the purported benefits advanced by supporters of a first-to-
file system do not justify the switch. First, the current push for first to file is
based primarily on the benefit of harmonization of the United States patent
system with the rest of the world. However, harmonization requires more
than just a change to first to file; expansion of prior user rights and earlier
publication would also be required. Second, first-to-file supporters argue
that a first-to-file system would be simpler than the current first-to-invent
system because it would eliminate expensive interference proceedings.
However, interference proceedings would not be eliminated simply by
adopting a first-to-file system. Along with a first-to-file system, the United
States would expand prior user rights. Because prior user rights also de-
pend on determinations of prior invention by a third party, the costs associ-
ated with determining the first to invent would be replaced by the costs of
showing prior invention to establish prior user rights. Third, advocates of
first to file believe that the conversion will result in faster disclosure of
inventions. Section 102(b) currently satisfies this goal by providing a one-
year time period between the time an invention is first publicly used or sold
and the time a patent application is filed. Since patents are generally not
published until eighteen months after they are filed, the amount of time
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saved in getting the information to the public may be negligible. Fourth,
some argue that the switch will not harm, and may in fact benefit, inventors
with fewer resources. Statistics suggest that seventy-five percent of inter-
ferences are decided in favor of the first to file anyway, so first to invent is
not helping individual inventors anyway. But the first party to file may not
have always been the first to invent; the second party to file may have had
an invalid patent and therefore the first to file prevailed in the interference
proceeding. Additionally, despite the contention that eliminating costly
interferences will help small businesses, many costs associated with inter-
ferences will simply be displaced by costs in determining prior user rights.
Thus there are no clear benefits of a first-to-file system.
The current system is a "carefully crafted bargain" 132 that effectively
satisfies the primary goal of encouraging inventors to invest in technology
while also providing economic benefits. The first-to-invent system better
accomplishes the primary economic goal of wealth maximization. Al-
though wealth maximization may seem better accomplished under a first-
to-file system because larger companies have more financial resources, the
analysis is more complex in the context of patent law. Because of the un-
derlying goal of promoting the progress of science and stimulating inven-
tion, the patent law must award the inventor who is most willing and able
to invest in inventing, rather than simply awarding the inventor with the
most financial resources, regardless of the incentives that would create. A
first-to-file system would encourage inventors to focus their limited re-
sources on building up their filing departments, rather than spending that
money on further innovation. The current system, on the other hand, satis-
fies the goal of wealth maximization in the patent law context by rewarding
the inventor who is most willing and able to invest in invention while si-
multaneously creating the incentive to focus limited resources on innova-
tion rather than building a slightly faster filing system.
Because the current system satisfies the key economic goal of wealth
maximization, a switch to a first-to-file system would only be justified
economically if there were a significant net benefit. However, the switch-
ing costs associated with a first-to-file system are significant, because many
companies will have to redirect their resources from research into building
faster filing departments. Moreover, the uncertainty in investment that ex-
ists under the current system would persist in a first-to-file system, since
the grant of a patent will still depend on whether one's competitors have
invested more resources in obtaining a patent. Finally, a switch to first to
132. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150.
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file would lead to a detrimental "race" to the USPTO in which many re-
sources would be wasted in order to file slightly faster, whereas those re-
sources could be better utilized in developing technologies. For these
reasons, there is no net economic benefit in the switch.
Besides satisfying the primary economic goal of wealth maximization,
the current system also achieves the important policy goal of innovation by
encouraging more competition. By allowing inventors to focus their limited
resources on developing an invention, rather than investing significant re-
sources in attempting to quickly draft and file patent applications, the first-
to-invent system encourages more small businesses and individual inven-
tors to participate in the patent bargain. This increased competition in turn
creates the incentive for all companies, large and small, to invest in re-
search and development, thus satisfying the primary policy goal of "pro-
moting the progress of Science and useful Arts." This careful balance of
economic incentives and policy goals would be needlessly disrupted by
switching to a first-to-file system that does not offer any clear advantages
to justify the costs associated with the change. Thus, the United States Con-
gress must reject the first-to-file provision proposed in the Patent Act of
2005.
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